EU Climate and Energy Governance: There’s more to it than meets the eye. CEPS Commentary, 14 July 2015 by Egenhofer, Christian. et al.
  
Christian Egenhofer is Senior Research Fellow and head of the CEPS Energy and Climate research 
unit; Andrei Marcu is Senior Advisor and Head of the Carbon Market Forum; Jorge Núñez-Ferrer is 
Associate Research Fellow at CEPS; Fabio Genoese is Research Fellow at CEPS; and Milan Elkerbout 
is Research Assistant in the CEPS Carbon Market Forum.  
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. 
The views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2015 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
EU Climate and Energy Governance: 
There’s more to it than meets the eye  
Christian Egenhofer, Andrei Marcu 
Jorge Núñez-Ferrer, Fabio Genoese 
and Milan Elkerbout 
 14 July 2015 
 
overance has suddenly become a hot topic in the EU, although one that is not 
necessarily well understood and whose discussion so far is largely confined to experts 
from the EU institutions, member states and stakeholders. Governance is an 
immensely complex task. One definition describes it as the “establishment of policies, and 
continuous monitoring of their proper implementation, by the members of the governing body 
of an organisation”.1 In the context of EU climate and energy policy, it broadly relates to, 
among many other issues, how and by whom are objectives formulated and who is responsible 
for determining whether they have been achieved, for reporting on their achievement and for 
ensuring compliance.   
Areas of governance     
EU energy and climate governance covers a wide diversity of issues ranging from the macro 
EU level to the way in which markets are run and managed. It certainly goes beyond the issues 
that are identified in the 2030 framework for climate and energy and the Energy Union.  
A reliable system of climate and energy governance in the EU would consist of at least seven 
areas, which we outline below. Although there may be a sense that such a system has recently 
been put in place, it is necessary to provide a comprehensive list that will allow for a good 
understanding of how complex and interrelated these various elements are. In order to ensure 
that these issues are dealt with in an integrated manner, we recommend that the European 
Commission creates a roadmap – possibly in the form of a Communication – that would 
indicate the direction, interactions and a timeline for adoption.  
 
                                                   
1 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/governance.html#ixzz3fm193HLQ 
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1) Interaction between policy instruments 
The interaction between the instruments to address the main objectives of the EU energy and 
climate package is of significant importance, as shown by the current overhang in the EU 
emissions trading system (ETS), which is primarily the result of erroneous demand 
expectations. How should this relationship be managed? It is hoped that the Market Stability 
Reserve (MSR) will provide part of the answer.  This means that the MSR will become a central 
element of governance, once the MSR is adopted. 
In more general terms, this area will include the relationship between the instruments used to 
achieve a long-term carbon-price signal, such as the EU ETS, to ensure that cost and 
competitiveness and the risk of carbon leakage is correctly managed (e.g. renewables 
integration and support, free allocation and state aid issues). This is also true for security of 
energy supply and the internal energy market.  
It would also include how the interaction between the carbon market, other policies and 
measures and the electricity market is governed. At a minimum, its governance should be 
flexible and take into account the governance enshrined in EU treaties as well as market 
realities.   
2) Role of markets 
The role that markets (electricity and carbon markets) play or should play becomes an 
important issue. What is the role of the ETS and what is the role of the internal energy market 
in decarbonisation? What will be the role of the so-called ‘energy-only’ market?  
Behind these questions is the issue of whether there is a need for complementary instruments 
to existing market functioning and how such relationships can be governed. It may be 
instructive to also look to experiences outside the EU. For example, in California, the ETS is 
residual while energy policy leads, whereas in the EU, the main focus has so far been on 
climate policy. 
In the last 15 years, gas and renewables accounted for 91% of new capacity. Yet, investment 
decisions affecting the technology associated with these two energy sources have not been 
triggered in the same way. So far, EU member states have primarily relied on dedicated policy 
instruments to support the deployment of renewables. Thus, while the stated governance was 
market-based, these investments have mostly been spurred by triggers other than price signals 
based on internal energy market regulation and the EU ETS.  Given the changed 
circumstances, member states are exploring ideas on how to make better use of the market in 
order to integrate renewables, which is seen as an indispensable mechanism to organise an 
increasingly decentralised electricity system. 
3) Governance of markets  
Markets need stability and predictability.  However, this must not be mistaken for rigidity and 
lack of responsiveness to changing conditions, especially within a timeframe that is relevant 
and responsive to market realities.  
How can the EU’s broader governance be adapted to a governance of the instruments in the 
2030 framework and the Energy Union to be able to observe the constraints and realities of the 
EU while responding to market realities that move at a different speed? How change is 
managed, especially in regulatory markets, is important as illustrated by recent experience. 
What gets enshrined in directives and what is put in regulation makes a significant difference 
in the governance of the market and its components. The change of EU ETS parameters does 
not always have to be subject to co-decision, as this creates uncertainty and gridlock.    
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4) Targets and responsibilities  
An important debate is the role of targets, notably the difference between legally-binding 
obligations based on EU policies and targets (e.g. the EU ETS or the 2009 Renewables 
Directive) and indicative targets, which express an ambition or direction. The legally binding 
targets are binding EU laws, enforceable by the European Commission and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union.  
Some member states in the European Council have indicated that they do not want legally 
binding targets, i.e. targets that can be enforced. The conclusion would be that the EU will 
need to look beyond targets and focus for instance on improving investment conditions by 
offering cost-effective financing mechanisms.  
If that is the case, responsibility will fall to the member states to indicate ways to improve co-
operation, which will become essential for an efficient integration of renewables and for 
reaching the overall target.  This would mean giving a real meaning to regional energy policy 
co-operation (see Egenhofer, Dimitrova and Popov, 2015). Recent initiatives offer good 
opportunities to reinforce such co-operation.2  It is important for the governance discussion 
that the EU or the European Commission gives guidance on regional co-operation (see De Jong 
& Egenhofer, 2014). Other complementary mechanisms, such as EU-level tenders may also 
provide options that ought to be examined. 
5) Funding instruments 
The role of the ETS-related funds, NER 300/400 and the Modernisation Fund cannot be over-
emphasised. Effective governance, based on their objectives and lessons learned, will be 
critical if they are to be a success. At EUA prices higher than €20, the amount available from 
the NER400 funds would amount to € 8 billion per annum for low-carbon projects (including 
industrial projects for the first time). While the potential impact of such a large fund may be 
reason for optimism, it also warrants a review of the roles that various institutions play in 
operating the fund.  
Investment in infrastructure (i.e. for renewables integration, smart and flexible grids, etc.) and 
energy efficiency are essential. However, the level of investment notably in infrastructure in 
the European Union has fallen considerably, due to the financial crisis and the ensuing 
economic stagnation of the EU.  
EU funds will be able to play their role and increase investments in these areas only if a number 
of conditions are met, some of them related to governance. One would think that better use of 
cost-benefit analyses or a better Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) would 
facilitate funding considerably. 
First, the creation of an investment-friendly environment in the energy sector is required, 
removing institutional and regulatory barriers that are unfit for a new, more decentralised and 
more integrated system. Second, the EU (and member states) can offer financial and fiscal 
incentives (possibly with some guaranteed certainty). This will necessitate the design of a 
stable and predictable framework that is as depoliticised as much as possible. 
 
 
                                                   
2 See e.g. “Joint declaration for Regional Cooperation on Security of Electricity Supply in the framework 
of the internal market” by 12 member states 8 June 2015); Pentalateral Energy Forum: Second Political 
Declaration of the Pentalateral Energy Forum of 8 June 2015; Egenhofer, Dimitrova and Popov (2015). 
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6) Role of the European institutions and the member states  
Turning to the institutional aspects, an important issue is the respective roles of the European 
institutions. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the European Commission as the guardian of 
the Treaty to ensure that the EU’s aspirations and objectives are achieved.  
Much will depend on the outcome from the legislation, notably the legislation on market 
design3 but also the renewables Directive (see Wyns et al., 2014). Depending on how much of 
the obligations will be legally binding, reporting and monitoring mechanisms will need to be 
adopted.  
These mechanisms could be developed, for example, in the context of integrated national 
energy and climate plans. The European Commission might think about developing templates 
to ensure transparency and comparability, for example, as has been done for the National 
Allocation Plans I in the ETS phases I4 and II.  
Other instruments exist, such as the State of the Energy Union report, the first of which 
expected by the end of 2015.  Such reports can be useful but they depend very much on 
whether there is a consensus. If member states disagree, such reports will not be able to make 
a big change.5 Nevertheless, the European Commission could use the State of the Energy 
Union report to clearly cite the shortcomings and barriers towards its energy and climate 
targets, although it might prefer not to do so.  
Of particular importance will be the update on the State Aid Guidelines, and the structural 
reform of the ETS. In this context the annual State of the EU ETS report would also be a great 
opportunity and instrument and become an integral part of the governance. 
An important question concerns the role of the European Parliament, especially its role in 
developing the governance system, but also in overseeing its implementation and 
enforcement.   
7) Energy Union and the role of climate and energy policy, respectively 
In its broadest interpretation, governance must be seen as the relationship between the 2030 
framework for climate and energy and the Energy Union. This starkly raises the question of 
the relationship between climate and energy policy. Fundamentally, while energy is a 
significant dimension of the climate issue, the two are not interchangeable. Addressing climate 
change as a separate and independent policy area is legitimate, but the two areas are deeply 
intertwined. 
 
 
                                                   
3 See forthcoming CEPS Energy Climate House Task Force Report on market design by Genoese & 
Egenhofer (forthcoming) 
4 A template can be an important element for monitoring and reporting, which, if properly done, can be 
effective in demonstrating whether the policy works or not. The transparency and comparability of 
outcomes of national allocation have made member states accept that more centralisation will be 
required in the future. This acceptance triggered the changes to the ETS in the 2007-09 Climate and 
Energy Package.  
5 For example, the First Strategic Energy Review (European Commission, 2007), which lead to the 2007-
09 Climate and Energy Package was published in a time when there was a consensus on the need to 
move on with climate policy. The Second Strategic Energy Review (European Commission, 2008), which 
also was the last one saw far less agreement among member states and consequently had less impact.  
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Conclusions  
The outcome of the debate on governance should be judged by the extent to which the EU and 
the member states are able to develop a framework that creates confidence for investors. This 
does not necessarily translate into nationally binding targets. Such a broader approach is 
warranted due to the changes that have occurred since 2007-09, when the last climate and 
energy package was adopted. The European Commission’s State of the Energy Union report 
could provide a framework for this approach, provided that the European Commission 
chooses to clearly identify shortcomings and barriers and those responsible for erecting the 
barriers. 
The EU is effective in finding compromises when it comes to resolving differences in 
substance. It is less effective when it comes to dealing with institutional struggles. There is a 
risk that a compromise is reached at the end that reflects a truce between the institutions but 
that does little to address the challenge to integrate renewables.  
EU climate and energy governance is about creating an adequate mechanism to ensure that 
the EU moves towards achieving its climate and energy targets, notably for renewable sources 
of energy. It aims to create a framework that generates the necessary market-induced 
investments.  
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